19:01:57 #startmeeting 19:01:57 Meeting started Thu Sep 1 19:01:57 2016 UTC. The chair is wumpus. Information about MeetBot at http://wiki.debian.org/MeetBot. 19:01:57 Useful Commands: #action #agreed #help #info #idea #link #topic. 19:02:21 proposed topics? 19:02:47 remaining 0.13.1 issues 19:02:48 hi 19:03:00 present 19:03:03 there are lots of 0.13.1-tagged pull requests open, any that should be prioritized for review? 19:03:04 present 19:03:16 wumpus: in fact, some conflict 19:03:19 (e.g. what should go in first) 19:03:24 yes, I thought so 19:03:26 https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/milestones/0.13.1 19:03:56 #link https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/milestones/0.13.1 19:04:04 8393 (segwit + compact blocks) is a big blocker 19:04:07 I'd like to mention that my Checkqueue Lockfree is passing tests, would like to hear what people need to see for it to merge (will be restructuing my commits later today.tomorrow) 19:04:09 #topic remaining 0.13.1 issues 19:04:32 (also can't stick around meeting past 12:15 FYI) 19:04:38 beyond that, we still need to choose a solution to the mempool dos issue around segwit 19:04:51 yes cb and then dos issues are probably 2 biggest? 19:04:58 this has been brought uo several times the past few meetings 19:05:10 #action #8393 (segwit + compact blocks) is a blocker, needs review testing and be merged 19:05:10 sipa: do we think that the BIP for cb+segwit is basically in final substantive form? i saw there were some language discussions 19:05:35 sdaftuar: matt had more comments on the bip, but just on wording, not on semantics 19:05:40 sorry what was cb ? 19:05:45 compact blocks 19:05:46 compact blocks 19:05:47 jeremyrubin: great to hear it is passing the tests, we can talk about the topic later, but not if you have to leave that soon probably 19:05:50 compact blocks 19:05:54 sorry 19:05:56 sipa: ok, i intend to review/test 8393 soon 19:06:00 thank you 19:06:05 beyond that, the dos issue 19:06:24 i'm not confortable with the previous suggestion of fully validating everything 19:06:35 as a change for a minor point release 19:06:45 wumpus: I'll try to swing back in the last few minutes of the meeting if possible? 19:07:18 it's a major change to how things have been done for the last few versions, that's for sure 19:07:37 so in a previous IRC meeting morcos had suggested mandatory feefilter + rejection cache only for non-witness tx, is that right? 19:07:50 so that leaves us with not storing witness txn in the rejection cache, feefilter (possibly mandatory), and heuristics to detect invalid bloating before validation 19:07:54 shouldn't we tag https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for 0.13.1? 19:08:14 sdaftuar: yes, there have been other suggestions in other talks to 19:09:01 I feel like I don't fully understand the issue, but couldn't the rejection cache use the [witness] hash instead of txid? 19:09:19 luke-jr: that's the approach i prefer, but it requires redoing tx relay to use wtxid, which is probably a big change 19:10:03 (and i don't think anyone has started work on it) 19:10:07 yes, that's a bigger change, and there are complications 19:10:13 like duplicating several indexes 19:10:30 and always risking downloading twice, because old nodes may announce using the txid 19:10:50 twice is better than $CONNECTIONS times, but still 19:11:04 old nodes won't relay witness transactions at all.. (or if they do, they'll be incomplete) 19:11:07 On CB, I'm due to test the latest version-- I had tested the earlier version.. just been testing other things recently. Those things are now merged. 19:11:42 i very much like the idea of mandatory feefilter 19:11:47 me too 19:11:57 moving the responsibiloty of resource cost to the sender 19:12:19 can someone summarize the idea? 19:12:19 it's the least hackish approach 19:12:20 would we get rid of free tx relay at the same time, or not necessarily? 19:12:45 I think mandatory feefilter should be done, though I think it is not as much of a silverbullet as some thing. Feerate is only one of several resource related limitations that get imposed. 19:12:47 but are we fine for 0.13.1 with only rejection cache for non-witness, and heuristics for detecting invalid witness bloating for the most common transaction types 19:12:50 sdaftuar: would be nice to get rid of that code 19:13:01 BlueMatt: i don't object in theory, but it's a sudden change for a point release 19:13:03 s/thing/think/ 19:13:08 what sort of heuristics? 19:13:09 sdaftuar: agree 19:13:10 sdaftuar: sure, i wouldnt recommend it for that 19:13:16 just stop allowing free transactions? 19:13:24 sdaftuar: in practice it's not enabled in any case. 19:13:28 s/allowing/relaying/ 19:13:30 jtimon: we effectively already do... 19:13:35 jtimon, it's about particular feerate, not just free 19:13:37 CodeShark: check whether the witness program's embedded scriot hash matches the hash of the witness script, for example 19:13:39 jtimon: they're already not relayed on nodes that are up for more than a few hours. 19:13:48 jtimon: because mempools are full 19:13:55 so what's the mandatory feefilter changing? 19:13:57 sipa, yes that would be an easy fix, early on 19:14:07 instagibbs: there is a PR for this 19:14:19 "mempoolminfee": 0.00001812 19:14:19 is that jls? I can't remember 19:14:24 if it's too long to summarize that's fine 19:14:40 instagibbs: yes, on a phonr, i can't seatch the pr number 19:14:49 #8593 19:15:01 jtimon: mandatory feefilter is that you can ban a node if it does not obey the feefilter you sent it 19:15:02 so mandatory fee filter would only apply to witness transactions? 19:15:11 er, NODE_WITNESS peers? 19:15:18 sdaftuar: that's a possibility 19:15:23 he moves full input validation up front in #8539 19:15:30 it doesn't make sense otherwise, we can't stop relaying transactions from older clients right 19:15:33 instagibbs: oh, no, not that one 19:15:43 would be abusive to disconnect older nodes imo 19:15:52 sdaftuar: It has to be negoiated somehow, node witness would be one way.. though a bit disruptive on testnet. 19:16:03 instagibbs: no one is going to do that. 19:16:04 instagibbs: full validation has some kinks to work out; something for 0.14 imho 19:16:11 mandatory feefilter seems liable to cause issues with 1) diverging fee policies; 2) ancestor feerate (CPFP) relay stuff 19:16:14 sipa: I see, thanks, like an additional filter per peer 19:16:16 sdaftuar: well you could gate it on something else (protocol version/message/whatever), but I'm not against fucking up testnet to do it for NODE_WITNESS 19:16:31 sipa, I don't see the PR you are talking about then 19:17:12 conceptually though: the idea is that we only download witness transactions from peers with whom we've negotiated mandatory feefilter semantics? 19:17:24 instagibbs: i think there is no PR right now for that proposal 19:17:30 sdaftuar: that would be fine too. 19:17:37 sdaftuar: yes 19:17:38 instagibbs: 8499 19:17:47 yes there is 19:17:49 oh that one 19:18:02 Indeed: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/8499/files 19:18:20 so, i would like to request review on 8499 and 8525 19:18:34 neither of those is a policy change 19:18:35 wumpus, can you tag that PR please #8499 19:18:47 sipa: will do 19:19:07 sure 19:19:15 I will review 8499 19:19:38 and untag 8593 19:20:15 done 19:20:38 so the only remaining thing is enforcing feefilter stronger as sdaftuar suggests only for witness peers 19:20:53 I'd ACK that 19:20:54 luke-jr: CPFP relay is already inhibited to the maximum extent that it could be by feefilter in the current non-mandatory form. Improving that will require some kind of package relay. Mandatory fee filter won't make it worse. 19:20:57 does that sound reasonable for 0.13.1? 19:21:07 FWIW, mandatory fee filter would couple well with 8525, rejection cache mostly exists due to a lack of feefilter. 19:21:22 besides fixing known bugs, obviously 19:21:24 gmaxwell: yup 19:21:29 sipa: yes 19:21:36 sipa: sure 19:21:45 great 19:21:55 you started a PR that did that, yes? 19:22:05 sdaftuar: not yet, i will 19:22:12 ok 19:22:19 I'd like feelers (and my addrman insert fix) to get backported. (I'm happy to do the 'backport') I think it will be important to have feelers to compensate for any loss of network density for witness enabled nodes. 19:22:29 gmaxwell, ack 19:22:34 sounds reasonable 19:22:51 ack on backporting feelers 19:22:59 curious to know if anyone has experimented with that on testnet and has any results? 19:23:17 i think it will take a while for network wide effects of feelers to become visible 19:23:41 oh maybe i misunderstood, i thought your own node would benefit from that by itself? 19:23:43 and testnet is not particularly in a sane p2p state 19:23:49 if a node with low feefilter connects to peers that all have a higher feefilter the higher filters would dominate. is that a problem? 19:23:53 we had repeated minor problems with isoloation on testnet early on when we deployed segwit there. I expect less of those on mainnet, and more proactive efforts to avoid them (eg spinning up nodes), but belt and suspenders is good. 19:24:01 right, but indirectly the results of addr messages will get better too from feelers 19:24:12 if the overall quality of addrmans improves 19:24:13 sipa: ah, yes 19:24:14 CodeShark: the filters are one way. "Here is what you can send me" 19:24:21 https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/8282 19:25:00 gmaxwell: sure...but your peers would filter stuff you wanted to see 19:25:10 next topic? 19:25:12 CodeShark: has nothing to do with fee filter. 19:25:14 i'm in a mildly unconfortable position here (irl meetup in milan, where BlueMatt spoke) 19:25:21 CodeShark: peers already filter anything they won't relay. 19:26:04 sipa: you can irc from my laptop if you prefer 19:26:06 its kind of "please, don't bother sending me things below X or I'll disconnect from you" 19:26:39 gmaxwell: no particular p2p protocol changes would be needed right now afaik (would just need to send the children first, and then teach the receiver to use the feerate including orphan txs) 19:27:40 if we're not careful, mandatory feefilter could in practice make fee policy code as sensitive as consensus code 19:27:58 luke-jr: how? 19:28:08 luke-jr: I'm not following, how does the peer know your rate X 19:28:10 ? 19:28:43 petertodd: if you change your fee policy code, you could be partitioned off from the other peers, no? 19:28:48 luke-jr: no 19:28:49 suggested topic: "Extra" softforks low_s and nulldummy 19:28:59 what am I missing? 19:29:06 only if you lie about it to your peers 19:29:14 instagibbs: ack topic 19:29:26 I believe low_s was discussed already? 19:29:30 am I missing something? isnt the feefilter potentially rather deanonymizing? we should probably round/randomize the amount somewhat, no? (or do we, I probably wouldnt know) 19:29:33 luke-jr: e.g. later we can add a package fee filter and nodes would signal a package fee filter of X, and a fee filter of 0. 19:29:42 i believe it needs rediscussing (low_s) 19:29:46 BlueMatt: good point 19:29:47 BlueMatt, that's a good point 19:29:48 BlueMatt: we do, but worht looking at again 19:29:49 BlueMatt: we do. 19:30:08 ok, nvm, ignore my ramblings 19:30:43 BlueMatt: please keep rumbling out loud, I hadn't even thought about it, now seems obvious 19:30:46 BlueMatt: but also, we really can make no guarentees that a single node with multiple interfaces can't be distinguished as the same node. There are several ways to do this. (obviously I'm happy to reduce them, but it's not a property we currently provide) 19:30:56 (can we move on to next topic?) 19:31:01 jtimon: it was specfically addressed in the original feefilter PR. 19:31:01 gmaxwell: indeed, shame we dont 19:31:04 ack next topic 19:31:04 also, what sipa said 19:31:17 wumpus: ring topic bell? :) 19:31:25 we put wumpus to sleep. 19:31:41 ;-) 19:31:48 gmaxwell: ring wumpus bell? 19:31:48 * sdaftuar rings the wumpus bell 19:31:51 ok, i'll go on anyway 19:32:02 I think that wumpus never sleeps 19:32:03 go sipa go 19:32:07 so, the nulldummy and low_s softfork proposals 19:32:30 #topic nulldummy and low_s softfork proposals 19:32:36 #topic nulldummy and low_s softfork proposals 19:32:39 it was discovered by jl that low_ has a really strange implementation issue leaked into the semantics 19:32:44 I don't remember any objections on low_s last time we discussed it? 19:32:56 which is not an issue for standardness, but for consensus i think we prefer clean sema tics 19:33:01 jtimon, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/8533#issuecomment-243973512 19:33:17 sipa: are clean semantics even possible? 19:33:25 instagibbs: thanks 19:33:38 gmaxwell: yes, if we also do the only-empty-signature-in-invalid-checksig sf 19:33:53 sipa: oh indeed okay, yes that would be clean 19:33:58 which is why i'd propose that we do low_s later, together with that empty sigs rule 19:34:07 and only bundle nulldummy with 0.13.1 19:34:19 s/0.13.1/segwit/ 19:34:23 The clenlyness issue is that lowS test fails for some encodings of invalid encodings. 19:34:37 er encodings of invalid signatures. 19:34:44 yes, some illegal signatures are exempt from low_s 19:34:50 would be a shame, but seems like a reasonable approach...has anyone checked for the #/frequency of invalid sigs in the chain? 19:34:59 that are non-0-length, at least 19:35:04 such signatures are NOT valid 19:35:15 but can bt OP_NOT'd, no? 19:35:23 yes, but nobody sane does that 19:35:30 has NULLDUMMY been discussed on the mailing list yet? i see one mention of it in passing about the LOW_S BIP. 19:35:32 sure, but /has/ anyone ever done so? 19:35:39 "yes, this output can be spent UNLESS BlueMatt likes it" 19:35:46 no objections on delaying low_s enforcement 19:35:54 BlueMatt: with the exception of intentional insanity, any invalid signature could be malleated to a zero length one, in any case. I had looked previously and seen no ongoing checksig-not activity, obvious. 19:35:58 I might suggest that it is not crazy to propose doing it in 0.13.1 if it has never happened 19:36:29 indeed, I'm asking with the assumption that someone might have done intentional insantiy as a test-case or so 19:36:35 BlueMatt: the only opractical difference is that the BIP to specify LOW_S would contain a rule that is pointless and complicating 19:36:40 i think we should aboid that 19:36:43 (wait, it is non-stad to do non-0-length, correct?) 19:36:46 BlueMatt: a checksig not has been done at least once in the chain history. 19:36:53 BlueMatt: good question, petertodd has anybody done that? :p 19:36:57 By someone triggering a fork off of bitcoin ruby. 19:37:03 petertodd: have you done that? 19:37:11 gmaxwell: sure, but with 0-length, or with a non-emtpy sig 19:37:20 yea, don't recall, we could check. 19:37:35 sipa: me personally, probably not - I'm a fine arts grad :P 19:37:38 But I don't think the test here should be none at all. If there was an obvious test someplace in the past, who cares? 19:37:46 (this would be immaterial if it is not already nonstd...which I do not recall) 19:37:48 jl also pointed out that the benefit of low_s is lower, as it can only be used.for mutating, but not for bloating 19:38:26 I was informed that non-0-length invalid sigs is not nonstd 19:38:30 I would propose we do so in 0.13.1 19:38:45 It is non-standard for segwit. (unless I am on drugs.) 19:38:55 gmaxwell: you're on drugs 19:38:57 I am on drugs then. Okay. Good to know. 19:38:59 are we still talking low_S ? 19:39:02 yes 19:39:03 I was assuming it was nonstd, and thus thought it might be reasonable for a softfork, but withdraw my insanity 19:39:08 wlel thats insane, we should fix that at least. 19:39:14 gmaxwell: ack 19:39:21 yes, it needs to be non-standard first. pronto. 19:39:24 0.13.1 should make invalid sigs which are non-0-length nonstd 19:39:25 agree 19:39:29 agree 19:39:35 yes, absolutely 19:39:42 +1 19:39:51 great 19:40:02 this needs a bip, no? 19:40:16 jtimon: yes, but we just suggest it as nonstd now 19:40:22 sure 19:40:25 (which certainly needs ML discussion too) 19:40:31 there is copy for null dummy as part of the old malleability bip, no? 19:40:51 nulldummy and fixed invalid? 19:40:54 null dummy is about the ignored arg for CMS 19:41:02 thus my follow up. 19:41:12 empty invalid was not part of bip62 19:41:19 okay. 19:41:41 because it wasn't needed fir standard txn at the time 19:41:54 ok, next topic? 19:42:00 jeremyrubin's stuff see above 19:42:14 12:04 < jeremyrubin> I'd like to mention that my Checkqueue Lockfree is passing tests, would like to hear what people need to see for it to merge (will be restructuing my commits later today.tomorrow) 19:42:23 jeremyrubin is busy making validation great again. I'm super excited about this. 19:42:29 sorry before we move topics -- we should repropose NULLDUMMY by itself on the mailing list, yes? 19:42:37 if he's here, at least 19:42:37 sdaftuar: ack 19:42:58 gmaxwell: ACK 19:42:59 so, one mitigation to this malleability stuff I think we should also consider doing, is having transaction replacement trigger if the tx has a higher fee rate than the old tx (over a certain ratio) 19:43:03 link to jeremyrubin's stuff? 19:43:25 petertodd: that would be a side effect of switching to wtzid based indexing, actually 19:43:30 https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/8464 19:43:31 instagibbs: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/8464 19:44:08 It's a very invasive change... 19:44:18 though, I like the concept 19:44:18 jonasschnelli: its worth it, by a lot 19:44:27 sdaftuar there is a NULLDUMMY only PR as well https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/8636 19:44:28 sipa: not quite - I'm proposing we re-broadcast such replacements to our peers 19:45:06 (for those interested, when it was first posted I went and reimplemented it as lockfree but with a single atomic which was contested between threads a decent amount.....my reimplementation might not have been ideal, but was only marginally better than master...jeremy's work is something like 10-20%) 19:45:16 sipa: need to pick a reasonable ratio, geometric series, so something like 75% would be absolute worst case a 4x bandwidth increase, while allowing no more than 25% bloat by a malleability attacker 19:45:31 petertodd: you're suggesting different replacement semantics than we have under BIP 125? 19:45:31 ah, i see 19:46:07 sdaftuar: yeah, obvious one would be to just do replacements if vout #1 == vout #2 regardless of BIP125, which handles malleability just fine 19:47:07 sdaftuar: mainly proposing this as a belt and suspenders to limit the damage of malleability attacks 19:47:13 petertodd: may just be better for mempool reconcillation to handle that. 19:47:27 gmaxwell: sure - when's that coming? :) 19:47:54 petertodd: interested in helping define it? :P 19:48:08 i believe we're drifting off topic 19:48:17 Who was phone? 19:48:25 gmaxwell: heh, seems like I should do a pull-req of this ratio thing for now - that's just a few lines of code 19:48:36 fair 19:49:01 other topics? 19:49:11 petertodd: if you do it right, it will interact well with mempool batching, and the batching will eliminate a lot of the bandwidth overhead. 19:49:27 yes, any other topic proposals? 19:49:32 s/mempool batching/relay batching/ 19:49:44 gmaxwell: oh, batching? I'm unfamilar with that idea 19:50:02 10 min bell 19:50:04 petertodd: relay behavior changed in 0.13, I think you're aware. 19:50:13 petertodd: will talk after meeting. 19:50:16 gmaxwell: ack 19:50:42 quick travis discussion? 19:50:47 seems that there are no other meeting topics proposals, so we can close 19:51:06 sure 19:51:07 [13bitcoin] 15jonasschnelli opened pull request #8643: [0.13 backport] Added feeler connections increasing good addrs in the tried table. (060.13...062016/08/feeler_013) 02https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/8643 19:51:09 Non-discussion: 0.13 deployment seems to be trouble free , congrats everyone. 19:51:10 #topic travis discussion 19:51:14 i've been away for the last couple weeks, can anyone summarize the state of our testsuite these days? 19:51:19 Yes 19:51:24 i feel like i've seen lots of people complaining 19:51:32 yes, congrats everyone on the 0.13.0 release 19:51:34 Basically theres some failing rpctests 19:51:40 and my own local runs are failing a lot too, but i havent figured out why yet 19:51:45 and the make check code is slow 19:51:45 what is this backupwallet test thing that keeps failing? 19:51:48 there are randomly failing RPC tests, and also some random timeouts 19:51:51 yes, there are a few racy conditions 19:51:56 segwit.py also fails sometimes 19:52:09 I've also seen an abandonconflict failure once 19:52:30 i believe i tracked down the segwit issue, which may be the root cause of some other issues 19:52:36 oh! good to know 19:52:39 I saw some indication before that this was actually misbehavior on the part of the travis infra, that it was occassionally running too slow and timing out. 19:52:41 cfields: elobarate? 19:52:43 (if that's the same as the one that was worsened by the timing change) 19:53:12 sipa: need to check if it's the same thing and gather my notes, take it up after meeting? 19:53:13 can we not just move the segwith test to the end/last item? 19:53:20 cfields: ok 19:53:26 sounds good 19:53:27 there's an issue open about txn_doublespend and segwit.py, it was worse and made batter by reverting a timeout change, but not solved (as MarcoFalke says) 19:53:29 s/segwith/segwit 19:53:37 the thing is, the tests never fail locally at least here 19:53:52 so yes I also suspect the travis infrastructure for some failiures 19:54:09 There's also an open issue with travis race conditions internally 19:54:10 anyhow the issue is https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8532 19:54:10 I suspect some tests fail in a non-reproducible way, I don't have local travis, but when the tests doesn't fail locally I just change the last commit id and force push, it works most times 19:54:13 sdaftuar says he sometimes sees the failures locally? 19:54:25 sipa: yes, with an error condition i don't understand at all, let me find it 19:54:26 e.g. if you push a commit before the last push finished testing 19:54:35 ok, same one then. the issue there is that the node heights are in sync, but the wallet hasn't necessarily updated with their txs. So sync_all() followed by a balance check is racy. 19:55:03 so we need a better sync call 19:55:15 cfields: so switch to a while loop until balances are an equal/expected value, with a certain timeout? 19:55:17 a kind of fence 19:55:46 sipa: that would imply updating all the balance checks to loops 19:55:53 run a ping and check the ping time on all the node.s 19:56:09 gmaxwell: from the RPC API? 19:56:22 getpeerinfo, i oresume 19:56:26 yes, the ping will act as a barrier in the current p2p protocol, though perhaps cfields is about to kill me 19:56:41 i hope cfields isn't changing that barrier effect 19:56:45 gmaxwell: iirc breaking that breaks things 19:56:46 yes, ping will work for that, but it's unclear how to use that in RPC tests 19:56:51 i was thinking about some rpc call like "wait_for_[height|block]" that would block until reached and finished processing everywhere. then we wouldn't need to loop 19:56:56 we had that discussion with cfields before, which is why I mention it. :P 19:56:58 i suppose that just introduces its own issues, though 19:57:03 heh 19:57:14 no, the barrier effect certainly shouldn't be removed, unless a better mechanism is introduced 19:57:34 (I'd actually kinda like a test which relies on pings being barriers, since some software assumes that for the p2p network, and, in fact, for some things you have to) 19:57:39 (I actually like ping being head of line blocked for the reason that it lets you measure processing delays of your remote peers) 19:57:40 and that's a huge protocol change, so probably not worth it right now 19:57:55 yes, that's out of scope 19:57:58 sorry, I started a tangent. 19:58:01 well, as a nasty short-term fix, we can just throw some sleeps in after sync. that should at least shut travis up while we work on a fix 19:58:08 for a "get the damn unit tests to work again", at least 19:58:10 in any case, maybe ping can be used to sync for these tests. 19:58:14 2 min bell 19:58:30 sleeps are pretty terrible, it's easy to get those wrong and travis has a very unpredictable load pattern 19:58:32 sleeps for now sound fine to me. We could all use more sleep. 19:58:37 hah 19:58:49 i was seeing this a bunch, but i haven't looked at the latest fails yet to confirm if they're the same: https://0bin.net/paste/nvDO+4yPU0w5332j#Y4BWnYpKcTTIW6ePHglWpEwpE4XtfA+I-NP2M3ObMkp 19:58:53 sleeps will just kick the problem a bit further down... 19:58:55 cfields: if we commit to reverting it within X days, ACK 19:58:55 but indeed this started when the timeouts were lowered all over the place 19:58:58 tests randomly faily though is ... not good. 19:59:07 cfields: go with the sleeps, better solutions later 19:59:08 jonasschnelli: I'm not suggesting delting fixing things at all. 19:59:08 and a sleep in sync_all will have a performance impact on the test-duration-tim 19:59:28 though, ack on the sleep for now 19:59:36 sgtm 19:59:38 right 19:59:39 BlueMatt: +1 for that. Sleeps are ripped out at next meeting if they're still there, and the tests fails again 19:59:48 we must not habituate ourselves to test failures being orinary, already that we weren't responding to failures as a potential emergency indicates we're in a bad state. 19:59:49 ACK 19:59:55 gmaxwell: yep 20:00:03 ACK to gmaxwell and cfields 20:00:08 also, dingdingding 20:00:09 POING 20:00:10 #endmeeting